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The Development of Compliance
Programs: One Company's Experience
Patrick J. Head*
I. ORIGINATION OF COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS
Although the original incidence of compliance programs in U.S. busi-
ness is somewhat murky, it is probably safe to say that the more formal
programs began in the 1940s, following the Second World War and the
emergence of the corporate community as a major player in U.S. industry.
As corporations increased in size and complexity, they recognized the need
to organize methods of internal policing, especially in view of the threats
from external state and federal regulatory authorities.
In the earliest days of formal compliance programs, antitrust law was
probably the centerpiece of all compliance programs. Antitrust law reached
its most heightened form of enforcement and complexity following the
Second World War and the growth of large corporations in concentrated in-
dustries. Although antitrust law was preeminent, the programs usually also
contained provisions concerning conflict of interests and securities law sec-
tions regarding insider trading.
These early programs pale in comparison to today's elaborate and
well-developed company-wide activities. In most instances the antitrust
attorney constituted the sole arbiter and was often the circuit rider to various
parts of the corporation, especially those in industries prone to antitrust ex-
posure, such as concentrated industries.
Following the enactment of the Sherman1 and Clayton Acts,2 an in-
creasing body of antitrust law developed and the sophisticated lawyers
. A.B. Georgetown University 1953 (Summa Cum Laude); J.D., Georgetown Law Cen-
ter, 1956; L.L.M., Georgetown Law Center, 1957; Partner, Altheimer & Gray, Chicago,
Washington, D.C.; Vice President and General Counsel, FMC Corp, 1981-1996; Vice-
President, Montgomery Ward, 1976-1981; Vice-President, General Counsel and Secretary,
Montgomery Ward, 1971-1976.
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within the Justice Department, and elsewhere, became driving forces for
self-policing by the corporate community. In addition, the securities law
process and development following the passage of the Securities Acts3 be-
came a close second in interest and exposure for corporate America.
These early programs were often limited in scope, contained perhaps
half a dozen pages of explanation and were usually administered solely by
the corporation's legal department and commonly by one attorney within
the department. The actual development of the compliance program's text
was usually accomplished in conjunction with the human resources depart-
ment and distribution was supervised by internal audit. Senior management
rarely involved themselves with the compliance program, as compared to
today's environment, in which senior management participation is required
by various codes and sentencing guideline programs that followed with the
increasing regulatory surveillance of the corporate community.
In the past, the program's text was revised from time-to-time and dis-
seminated to the entire corporate body and accounted for by internal audit.
The results were usually reported to the Chairman of the corporation's
Board of Directors and also, as part of or following an Audit Committee
meeting hearing. Today, these programs would be considered rudimentary
because now the programs are often overviewed by a Public Affairs Com-
mittee, an Audit Committee and once a year, by the Board itself.
As the rewrites of the compliance programs developed, the compliance
program incorporated new provisions as new laws were enacted, bearing on
the operations of corporations in America. The most notable of these new
laws were the environmental laws,4 the anti-bo rcott rules,
5 export controls6
and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).
Though the FCPA is only a small portion of the coverage of corporate
compliance programs, this perspective will focus on the FCPA and, to a
certain extent, on other collateral impact statutes, such as securities and in-
ternal revenue laws. It will not delve into related statutes, such as the over-
seas reach of antitrust laws.
115 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994).
215 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1994).
3Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1994); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78a (1994).
4 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA),
42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1994); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §
6901 (1994).
'50 U.S.C. § 2407 (1994).
650 U.S.C. § 2404 (1994).
7Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494, as amended
by Title V of the Omnibus Trade & Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, §§
5001-03, 102 Stat. 1415, 1415-25 (codified as amended at 15. U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2),
78m(b)(3), 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff (1994)).
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II. CONTINUED EVOLUTION OF COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS
In the 1980s, a new program dramatically changed the scope and style
of compliance programs. This new program, the Defense Industry Initiative
on Business Ethics and Conduct (Defense Industry Initiative),8 developed
out of the so-called "Ill Wind" investigation at the Department of Defense.
The Ill Wind investigation was a wide-ranging examination of relationships
between defense contractors and Defense Department officials, which arose
out of suspicious financial arrangements between the two and resulted in
some indictments. Then Deputy Security of Defense Vance Packard sug-
gested that the defense industry adopt its own regulations in order to police
itself. The CEO of General Electric, Jack Welch, organized the Defense
Industry Initiative to a certain extent in reaction to the indictments of some
five General Electric executives resulting from the Pentagon investigation.
Developed in 1986, the Defense Industry Initiative was a direct result of the
President's Blue Ribbon Committee on Defense Management (the Packard
Commission). In it, defense contractors developed a self-policing code of
conduct with regard to contracting activities with the Department of De-
fense.
The most important new ingredient added to compliance programs by
the Defense Industry Initiative was the concept of voluntary disclosure, or
for a corporation to turn itself in case of fault, in order to satisfy the gov-
emment's need for assurance of self-policing. This self-confession or vol-
untary disclosure program became an add-on provision to previous
compliance programs dealing with the FCPA and other overseas reaching
statutes, creating internal dilemmas on the issue of Fifth Amendment pro-
tections. Under voluntary disclosure, corporations were expected to "turn
themselves in," including turning in employees. Hence, some corporations
adopted "little Miranda" warnings to inform employees of their rights
against self-discrimination. Under the Defense Industry Initiative, compli-
ance programs, including those dealing with the FCPA, took on a fully in-
stitutional nature and actual career positions developed within companies
for compliance purposes. Vice presidents for compliance began to appear
on organization charts.
8The Defense Industry Initiative had no statutory basis. If anything, the Defense Indus-
try Initiative was intended to avoid regulation of corporations through voluntary self-
regulation by the corporations themselves, at the suggestion of the Deputy Secretary of De-
fense, Vance Packard. See Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Minimizing Corporate
Civil and Criminal Liability: A Second Look at Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78 GEO. L.J.
1559 (1990); Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, Corporate Compliance Programs as a De-
fense to Criminal Liability: Can a Corporation Save Its Soul?, 47 RUTGERS L. REv. 605
(1995); Note, Growing the Carrot: Encouraging Effective Corporate Compliance, 109
HARV. L. REv. 1783, 1793 n.2 (1996) (citing Allen R. Yuspeh, The Defense Industry Initia-
tives (DII): Lessons Learned, U.S. Sentencing Commission Symposium, Sept. 7, 1995, in
CORPORATE CRIME IN AMERICA: STRENGTHENING THE 'GOOD CITIZEN' CORPORATION, 89, 90-
91).
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The final stage in the evolution of compliance programs occurred after
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines,9 and in particular the Corporate Sentencing
Guidelines, were upheld by the United States Supreme Court.10 The Corpo-
rate Sentencing Guidelines created an elaborate system of multiplying fines
for corporations found guilty of offenses, depending on such things as will-
fulness, level of corporate knowledge, repeat offenses and the like. The
Corporate Sentencing Guidelines and resulting compliance program provi-
sions apply solely to criminal transactions, even though the basic ingredi-
ents of the Guidelines were modeled on provisions of the earlier Defense
Industry Initiative, including voluntary disclosure and written codes of con-
duct.
Whereas the Defense Industry Initiative was designed to ward off more
regulation by the Pentagon, the emergence of the Sentencing Guidelines
actually directed the formation of compliance programs in order to lessen
the impact of criminal sentencing and, in many instances, exoneration. The
very existence of a program itself offered protection against problems such
as court-imposed programs. The Sentencing Guidelines' system imitated
the Defense Industry Initiative's voluntary disclosure provision, which was
probably the most controversial inheritance from the Defense Industry Ini-
tiative. These programs also resulted in corporations developing so-called
"Miranda Rules" in order to protect Fifth Amendment rights of executives
and employees. Corporations, such as FMC, after much thought, adopted
ground rules under this program, warning executives and employees of the
right not to incriminate themselves. FMC's program, discussed later, was
described as "a corporate and employee responsibility program."
III. COMPLIANCE AND OVERSEAS ACTIVITIES
As compliance programs developed, more and more multinational cor-
porations built into their programs very specific sections dealing with for-
eigu corrupt practices, the Arab Boycott, and the overseas reach of antitrust
statutes. Hence, the programs became, for the first time, worldwide com-
pliance programs. Additionally, the Defense Industry Initiative and the
Sentencing Guidelines impacted the development of compliance programs.
Thus, a whole new body of law, as contrasted to domestic issues, began
driving compliance programs, forming them into international codes of
conduct rather than into programs that simply complied with domestic laws.
Any multinational corporation domiciled in the United States faces, on
an almost daily basis, three bodies of U.S. law that can affect its business,
and, indeed, embroil it, not only in civil difficulties, but possibly serious
criminal ones as well. Each area of law arose out of incidents abroad,
sometimes of a foreign policy nature (such as export controls) and some-
9Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (1994). The Corporate Sentencing
Guidelines are part of the overall U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.
I°Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
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times in reaction to international incidents (foreign corrupt practices and
Arab Boycott).
The three bodies of law include: 1) The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA); 2) the Arab Boycott; and 3) the various export controls. The
FCPA was enacted in reaction to the overseas bribery scandals of the early
to mid-1970s,1 while the Arab Boycott statute was a reaction to the Bagh-
dad-based Arab Boycott list aimed at corporations or individuals doing
business with Israel. Export controls covered issues involving rogue na-
tions, terrorism and proliferation of arms concerns.
Each of these statutes is covered in well-defined compliance programs
within corporations. Such programs set out specific guidelines for operat-
ing under, and compliance with, these laws. Indeed, reporting requirements
themselves can involve a corporation in fines and penalties. Reporting re-
quirements are rendered increasingly difficult for corporations with remote
offices, normal employee turnover, and differing compliance attitudes of
employees who are non-U.S. nationals.
The FCPA makes it unlawful to make a payment, which, directly or
indirectly, with bribery of foreign officials, to obtain, or secure business.
And yet, it allows so-called facilitating payments ("grease payments"), 12 as
an acknowledgment of the practicality of doing business in differing cul-
tural traditions. FMC requires that even these payments must be approved
in advance by the operating manager.
1 3
The Arab Boycott law, on the other hand, sets up a complex set of re-
porting requirements on doing business with Arab countries, or not doing
business with Israel, including stringent reporting requirements on contacts
even if no action of an overt nature occurs. And yet, some transactions by
overseas subsidiaries can lawfully take place depending on the origin of the
goods, for instance, Argentine parts, shipped and assembled through an
Irish subsidiary. In other words, if a U.S. subsidiary ships items that are
" See also Stanley Sporkin, The Worldwide Banning of Schmiergeld: A Look at the For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act on its Twentieth Birthday, 18 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 269 (1998).
12 See also Arthur F. Mathews, Defending SEC and DOJ FCPA Investigations and Con-
ducting Related Corporate Internal Investigations: The Triton Energy/Indonesia SEC Con-
sent Decree Settlement, 18 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 303 (1998) (discussing grease payments);
Daniel L. Goelzer, Designing an FCPA Compliance Program: Minimizing the Risks of Im-
proper Foreign Payments, 18 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 282 (1998) (same).
13 FMC Code of Ethics and Business Conduct Guidelines § 1-3, at 13 [hereinafter Busi-
ness Conduct Guidelines] (on file with the Northwestern Journal of International Law &
Business). The Business Conduct Guidelines states that these payments "may be made, but
only with the approval of a vice president." Id.
14For a recent report on the impact of the Arab boycott of Israel on U.S. firms and on
U.S. anti-boycott legislation, see James R. Hines, Jr., Taxed Avoidance: American Partici-
pation in Unsanctioned International Boycotts (1997) (National Bureau of Economic Re-
search Working Paper No. 6116) (arguing that "U.S. anti-boycott legislation significantly
reduces the willingness of American firms to participate in the boycott of Israel").
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entirely foreign-produced, the subsidiary would be subject to the Arab Boy-
cott regulation.
Finally, the export controls cover a myriad of laws and regulations,
dealing with such diverse geographic areas as Cuba, Libya and Sri Lanka,
on issues ranging from civil rights and terrorism to arms proliferation. This
perspective will not attempt to cover any other broad area of foreign busi-
ness, such as the specialized one of doing business under statutes and regu-
lations governing military sales financed with U.S. funds.
Today, any major corporation will include in its compliance program
significant sections dealing with each of these legal areas. These are
backed up with a multitude of loose-leaf volumes of specific instructions,
model forms, and reference to in-house legal cadres with specific knowl-
edge in these practice areas. No U.S. corporation, doing business abroad
will escape dealing at some stage with each, or all, of these laws.
Although heavy focus in this paper and in other perspectives on over-
seas business has been placed on the FCPA, and properly so, corporate ex-
ecutives can be lulled into some sense of complacency, especially with
efforts to diminish the problems in overseas bribery by the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)15 and the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC).16 Because of this focus, other lower profile
problems, such as boycott and export regulations may not receive their
proper coverage.
Although the heaviest attention has been on the FCPA, executives
abroad, or a corporation's control people at home, need equally to worry
about host country bribery statutes or regulations which can place an over-
seas executive at personal risk. Additionally, at home, resolving FCPA
problems overseas may overlook local U.S. violations of false reporting un-
der the securities laws or improper tax deductions under the Internal Reve-
nue laws.17
In addition to IRS reporting issues, the U.S. securities laws which are
basically disclosure statutes, provide for penalties for failure to report accu-
rate financials which can be a further serious consideration when monies
expended in bribes are masked or improperly reported, 8 Often FCPA vio-
lations have been buried in commission agent's fees, or other administrative
entries, designed to mask their true purpose.
Obviously, both of these statutory areas present dilemmas under the
FCPA. This has often meant that, when transactions are uncovered after
15See, e.g., Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Interna-
tional Business Transactions, Dec. 18, 1997, Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, 37 I.L.M. 1 (1998).
16ICC Announces New Rules to Fight Extortion and Bribery in Trade, Int'l Trade Daily.
(BNA), at D3 (Mar. 28, 1996).
1726 U.S.C. § 162 (1994).
1 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1994).
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investigation, even in arguable situations, it may be necessary to correct
corporate financials for reporting purposes, or to amend tax returns, so as
not to contain improper deductions. This can be a meticulous and painful
process, possibly jeopardizing or calling into question, important financial
filings.
IV. FMC AND COMPLIANCE SPECIFICS
The next sections will discuss specifically the evolution of a portion of
FMC's compliance programs and some specifics contained in these pro-
grams. FMC's program developed in three stages: (1) the first stage in-
volved guidelines driven by antitrust considerations, rewritten to
accommodate new laws, e.g., the FCPA and environmental laws; (2) the
second stage occurred because of contracting problems with defense con-
tractors; and (3) the third state was influenced by the Corporate Sentencing
Guidelines, which added more severe penalties in criminal cases involving
corporations.
A. Compliance Programs
Most sophisticated companies of significant size, such as the FMC
Corporation, have long had compliance programs, especially in the areas of
antitrust and conflict of interest. 9 As new statutes were enacted, the corpo-
rations amended the programs to cover foreign corrupt practices, Arab Boy-
cott, and export controls. Environmental provisions2 and government
contracting provisions2l were also added during rewrites as regulations in
these areas took effect. The stated objective of the programs is to avoid ex-
posure to violation of statutes and the concomitant possible civil or even
criminal action against the Corporation.
FMC's compliance programs became more sophisticated than the
original codes or guidelines, including innovative provisions for voluntary
disclosure to authorities, which were virtually unknown in past programs.
FMC originally subscribed to the Defense Industry Initiative22 and as a re-
sult assembled:
* written codes of conduct;
* ethics training programs;
* internal hotline or ombudsmen;
* a system of disciplining employees who act improperly; and
19FMC Corporation's original program, dating back to the 1940s, was called "Business
Conduct Guidelines," and featured antitrust as its centerpiece.20Business Conduct Guidelines, supra note 13, at 21-23.21 Id. at 23-25.
2For a discussion of the Defense Industry Initiative, see supra note 8 and accompanying
text.
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a commitment to policies of voluntary disclosure of potential vio-
lations of law.
The Defense Industry Initiative caused a total rewrite of the old Busi-
ness Conduct Guidelines and an addition of a new Code of Ethics. FMC's
revised "Business Conduct Guidelines" 23 leads off with Section I devoted to
"Prohibited Payments." Though political contributions are covered in Sub-
section 1.2., the more elaborate text devoted itself to coverage of payments
to government officials, with the FCPA specifically referenced 4
The Business Conduct Guidelines focus on certain very pragmatic is-
sues dealing with so-called "grease payments"25 because of the recurring
nature of these issues in practice. FMC recognizes the need for these pay-
ments: "In some countries where the company operates, required adminis-
trative action or procedural assistance, not involving obtaining or retaining
business, can be obtained in a timely fashion only through the payment of
modest gratuities to government officials or employees. ''26 However, a hi-
erarchy of control requiring a corporate vice president's approval was es-
tablished: if over $5,000 was to be paid in grease payments, advance
approval by the general counsel and the executive vice president-finance
(Chief Financial Officer) would be required, with a report on the transaction
sent to the corporate controller within thirty days.27
The same text, anticipating problems with the use of agents (Subsec-
tion 5), sets out clear guidelines for their use: (1) written text; (2) no con-
nection with government officials; and (3) a model form for the agent to
sign-off on compliance with law. Because of perceived problems inherent
in the use of agents overseas, most corporations, such as FMC, adopt a form
provision in their agency contracts, specifically asking agents to attest that
no violation of U.S. or host country laws had occurred and no bribery had
taken place. Authorities have viewed these provisions as helpful in defense
of accusations of violations.
Following a number of years after the Defense Industry Initiative, the
passage of the Sentencing Guidelines legislation as applied to corporations
and the Supreme Court's decision to uphold the Sentencing Guidelines re-
sulted in an expansion of FMC's codes of conduct beyond the defense in-
dustry group to the corporation as a whole. These provisions, modeled
somewhat on the Defense Industry Initiative, and also containing voluntary
disclosure provisions, have now become another familiar part of FMC's
23Business Conduct Guidelines, supra note 13.
24 d. at 13. The Business Conduct Guidelines state that "[p]ayments of corporate, sub-
sidiary or personal funds or anything else of value may not be made to a government official,
employee, political party or candidate in order to obtain or retain business..., or to direct
business to any other person." Id.
25See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(b), 78dd-2(b) (1994).26 Business Conduct Guidelines, supra note 13, at 13.271d.
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compliance program.28 The ingredients as prescribed by the Sentencing
Guidelines Commission and as adopted by FMC are as follows:
* Compliance standards and procedures;
* Overall responsibility assigned to specific high level individuals
within the organization;
* No delegation of discretionary authority to persons with propensity
to illegal activities;
* Effective communication of standards and procedures to employ-
ees and agents;
* Reasonable steps to achieve compliance with standards, including
monitoring, auditing and hotline;
* Consistent enforcement with appropriate disciplinary measures;
* Reasonable steps to deal with offenses when detected, and to pre-
vent further offenses;
* Effective measures to detect and manage areas where substantial
risk is known; and
* Nature and degree of program depend on size of organization.
The effect of crafting this compliance program, along with administra-
tion and auditing, is designed to allow corporations to escape or minimize
the significant fines and penalties of the new sentencing guidelines as ap-
plied to corporations.29 The advantages of such programs have been de-
scribed as follows:
* Reduction of likelihood of basic violation;
* Reduction of sentence in case of violation;
* Removal of basis for a stockholder suit; and
* Avoidance of court imposed programs encouraged by the Commis-
sion in the absence of one in place.
The initial dilemma facing FMC's legal department and most corporate
general counsel in developing a compliance program concerned what to in-
clude since hundreds of statutes could impact corporations in the criminal
area. However, any counsel of significant tenure should easily be sensitive
to areas of exposure based on historical experience. Hence, FMC chose
eight areas in which it had, or might expect to have, exposure due to the
nature of its business (e.g. defense contracting) or products handled (envi-
ronmental). In addition, FMC added provisions dealing with the classic
notions of obstruction of justice, false reporting or the like, due to which a
28FMC Corporate and Employee Responsibility Program [hereinafter Responsibility
Program] (on file with the Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business).29See U.S. SENTENCiNG GUIDELrNEs MANUAL § 8C2.5(f) (1995).
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corporation could experience difficulty procedurally even when no actual
substantive violation might be involved.3
From the outset, FMC identified the FCPA and the Arab Boycott stat-
utes as potentially problematic areas, ranking them third, after environment
and antitrust laws. These statutes would probably have ranked second after
environment laws, had not antitrust coverage experienced a resurgence in
the latter part of the Bush Administration and the beginning years of the
Clinton Administration.
Three full pages of text3 are devoted to the FCPA and the Arab Boy-
cott. 32 The Responsibility Program places considerable stress on "facilitat-
ing payments" and references back to the controls in the Business Conduct
Guidelines.33
Most major companies, such as FMC, routinely seek Board approval in
devising compliance programs after the programs have been reviewed by
either an Audit or a Public Affairs Committee of the Board. To achieve
Board approval FMC drafted a board resolution, sanctifying the program
and naming the key non-legal executives who are in charge of the admini-
stration. In addition, annual reports on the compliance programs are made
to the Public Affairs Committee and then to the entire Board. The Audit
Committee is also separately briefed on any specific matters if, and when,
they occur.
In addition to establishing the guidelines and delineating the roles of
key executives and lawyers, FMC, along with many companies, developed
videos, which explained the areas of conduct in which the corporation
might be at risk, such as, antitrust, foreign corrupt practices, product safety,
intelligence gathering and the like. Other companies also utilize videos and
outside consultants to prepare sophisticated programs for the education of
all the employees of companies (as provided for in the regulations under the
Sentencing Guidelines 4). These programs range from strict legal criminal
considerations to guidelines for conflict of interest and other practical di-
lemmas posed for employees within an organization.3
30FMC styles it "Related Crimes." Responsibility Program, supra note 28, at 24.
"Fraud, bribery, perjury, obstruction of justice are felonies and may be easier to prove than
the basic crimes.. ." Id.3 1id. at 9-11.
3210 U.S.C. § 2410(i) (1994).33 Responsibility Program, supra note 28, at 9.34See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(f) (1997).35FMC actually did an explanatory video of key executives discussing conflict problems
moderated by Northwestern Law School Professor Steven Lubet, in addition to its overall
Guidelines video.
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B. Organization of Inside Compliance Programs
In the FMC model, the compliance program was formed first by identi-
fication of the areas of exposure, that is, specific criminal statutes that FMC
had been exposed to in the past, plus generic areas of criminal exposure
such as false statements and obstruction of justice, which often become ar-
eas of prosecution when the statutory violation is not clearly identified. It is
not uncommon to find a corporation prosecuted for the false execution of
documents alone.
Since FMC's Guidelines and Codes were already in existence, rewrites
were begun within the legal department, updates in the applicable law were
reviewed, and a full new corporate program developed.36
Once it had been assembled by the legal department, and after key ar-
eas were identified, the new program was presented to the Audit Committee
of the FMC Board of Directors for review. As part of this process, the
Chairman identified key non-legal executives and by memorandum de-
scribed the responsibilities of these executives and identified the lawyer as-
sistant in each area of specialty for the management of a program, including
audit, education and dissemination of information to the company at large.
The CFO was assigned to the FCPA and Arab Boycott areas (supported by
an in-house lawyer) because of the financial and control nature of these ex-
posures.
Typically, with FMC, or other corporations, some form of ethics re-
view committee is organized to review the progress of the program and re-
view changes as well as resolution of major conflict issues. Legal, senior
management, Human Resources and Public Affairs executives serve on this
committee. The scope, power, and authority of these groups differ from
corporation to corporation and are often dictated by size or degree of diffi-
culty experienced by the corporation in the past.
The Sentencing Guidelines themselves envision the use of training
programs.37 Since the implementation of the program is as important as the
content itself, many companies have run into the difficulty of having a pro-
gram fully conceived on paper, but have not implemented it. So, in at-
tempting to obtain the benefits of a compliance program, if these
corporations are challenged for violation of a statute, they would be unable
to support the administration of the program. To overcome this problem,
FMC ensured wide dissemination of the explanatory video, in the areas of
FCPA and Arab Boycott, and required a circuit riding house counsel to pay
periodic overseas visits to offices with exposure to violations.
The importance of these programs cannot be minimized, especially in
regard to such crucial areas as antitrust and foreign corrupt practices law, as
36This was styled the "Corporate and Employee Responsibility Program," to emphasize
responsibility while incorporating the new sentencing guidelines provisions. Responsibility
Program, supra note 28.3 7 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(f) (1997).
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many of these involve double and treble damages involved as well as
criminal liability. The Sentencing Guidelines themselves provide for lesser
fines and penalties in the face of implemented compliance programs.3 8
Failure to develop such programs can result in court imposed programs.
C. Conclusion
The balance sheet on FMC's compliance programs has generally been
good. The earliest program, which was centered around antitrust concerns,
was simpler in nature than later forms but accomplished the main end of
shielding the corporation from potential or actual violations of federal or
state antitrust laws. The success of the earlier program is a tribute to the ef-
forts of FMC's antitrust counsel who developed the earliest programs and
met with key executives and employees and those units most where prob-
lems were most likely to occur. Since FMC has been in the business of
commodity chemicals and other areas where there are common trade asso-
ciations and constant cross supply of ingredients, continuous vigilance was
necessary. Though some investigations necessarily occurred during the last
fifteen plus years, FMC has been able to steer clear of any major exposure
in the antitrust field.
The second stage of compliance programs developed as overseas issues
became more important but implementation has proven to be somewhat
more difficult, as these overseas areas became a prominent part of compli-
ance programs, particularly, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the Arab
Boycott. As a result, the surveillance required in the compliance program
had to be extended worldwide. With the changeover of personnel and the
distances involved, the implementation of these programs has proven to be
more difficult. Hence, technical violations (reporting) have occurred from
time to time and resulted in investigations. However, FMC's record again
is highly satisfactory since no major cases have developed in regard to the
more elaborate compliance programs encompassing overseas related stat-
utes and regulatory matters.
Finally, the Sentencing Guidelines,39 called the Corporate and Em-
ployee Responsibility Program at FMC, have extended the reach of compli-
ance programs to specific areas of criminal statutes. As a result the
objective of the guidelines is to lessen fines and, by the creation of the pro-
gram itself, to avoid the exposure of specific criminal statutes for the corpo-
ration on a whole. To date, this program still continues to evolve, but has
resulted in good surveillance of the corporation as a whole. Because this is
a continuous program, however, the surveillance, the educational program
and the responsibilities of the non-legal officers and their legal assistants
require continuous monitoring and training.
38Id.
391d.
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Compliance programs can make a difference. However, care must be
taken that they are not just for cosmetic purposes. Witness the recent
book40 calling to task corporate and governmental programs dealing only
with appearance and not substance.
To be workable, such programs must be supported from the top down.
If there is no real support at the executive level, the word drifts down the
ranks that form is more important than substance. Under the pressure to
obtain business, some corporate managements, competing with foreign cor-
porations under less severe restrictions, may view operating executives who
take compliance too seriously as being naYve or out of tune with the real
world. But, when a violation is picked up, as in the Baxter boycott prob-
lems of recent years,41 it can shake a company's management to the top.
As Tom Sullivan4 2 cautions, "if the block of granite toppling off the
roof falls on you, it makes no difference to you that it missed others." It
isn't easy to assemble, monitor and explain compliance programs. They are
often form and detail oriented. They must be administered through an ever-
changing employee populace. Although, not to do them can sometimes re-
sult in a "bet your job, bet your company" scenario.
40PETER W. MORGAN & GLENN H. REYNOLDS, How THE ETHics WARS HAVE
UNDERMINED AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, BusiNEss, AND SocIErY 7-46 (1997).41 Baxter's general counsel was indicted for alleged violations.
42Partner, Jenner & Block; former U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois
(1977-81).

